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A Confidential State Department Report
On October 8,1948, a senior official in the Netherlands Embassy in Washington DC 
handed an English translation of a Dutch memorandum to Frederick Nolting, who at 
that particular moment served as acting director of the Philippines and Southeast 
Asian Affairs Office (PSA) in the State Department. Classified as secret, the document 
bore the title "Relevant Portion of a Confidential Report of an Important Netherlands 
Source in Indonesia dated September 13,1948." A few weeks earlier, the original Dutch 
version of the report had begun to circulate in Jakarta under the signature of 
Lieutenant-General Simon Hendrik Spoor, the Commander-in-Chief of the Dutch 
military forces in Indonesia.* 1 The first three paragraphs of the text conjured up a well-
* A Fulbright Fellowship funded the research on which this essay is based; it constitutes part of a book-in- 
progress (with Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg), tentatively entitled The Indonesia Connection: The United States, 
the Cold War, and Decolonization in Southeast Asia, 1945-1949.1 am grateful to Audrey and George Kahin, 
Benedict Anderson, William Frederick, and Danilyn Rutherford for their constructive criticism on earlier 
drafts.
1 "Relevant portion of a confidential report of an important Netherlands source in Indonesia, dated 
September 13,1948," in Records of the Department of State, decimal files (Record Group 59, hereafter RG 
59; RG 59 refers to the decimal files unless noted otherwise), Box No. 6440,856D.00/10-848, in National 
Archives II, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NAII). The original Dutch version, which began to 
circulate in Jakarta in mid-September, can be found in S. J. van der Wal, P. J. Drooglever, and M. Schouten,
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connected bridegroom and his fabulously rich fiancee, who were being urged by 
relatives abroad to resolve their personal discord, chronicling "a family romance" gone 
awry.2
The introduction made General Spoor's report extraordinary. His narrative de­
picted the Dutch-Indonesian confrontation as a nasty fight between a rational, if pos­
sessive, Dutchman—acting in the manner of a "macho stud," as Frank Costigliola has 
recently typified such behavior in the context of US foreign policy in the post-World 
War II era—and a neurotic Indonesian bride-to-be.3 In Spoor's story, the Indonesian 
Republic emerged as a volatile woman, who had acknowledged that her relationship 
with her Dutch fiance was a travesty.4 Since the birth of the Inonesian nationalist 
movement in the first half of the twentieth century, it had gradually dawned on her 
that any kind of union with the northern European groom would always be based on 
exploitation rather than kindness or generosity. At the Indonesian woman's behest the 
couple had separated on August 17, 1945. This was the day when a group of restless 
young nationalists had pushed Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta into proclaiming the 
sovereign Republic of Indonesia. Since then, the newly liberated woman was adamant 
about receiving her official freedom, and she pursued her independence fiercely. As 
Spoor intimated, however, the ill-fated couple was under enormous pressure from the 
international community to reconcile their differences.
My analysis, in this instance, is not preoccupied with General Spoor per se, even if 
he plays a central role because the confidential report appeared in his name. Instead, I 
rely on the General's perceptions of his Indonesian enemy, registered in his idiosyn­
cratic narrative, as a multi-layered cultural text. The author and his eccentric story 
function as devices that can illuminate the lingering habit of male Dutch colonizers, 
whether in military or civilian positions, to inscribe Indonesians with feminine 
attributes, consisting of such human qualities as weakness and malleability.5 I also use 
his allegory as a point of departure for an examination of the metamorphosis that had 
taken place in the autonomous agency of the revolutionary guardians of the 
Indonesian Republic. I do so by exploring the ways in which they understood, articu­
eds., Officiele bescheiden betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische betrekkingen (hereafter NIB), vol. 15 (1948) (The 
Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis/Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), p. 49.
2 Lynn Hunt, The Family Romance of the French Revolution (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1992).
3 Frank Costigliola, "The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance," 
Diplomatic History 21 ,2  (Spring 1997): 165; Emily S. Rosenberg has noted that during the Cold War "the 
word 'neurosis' became largely attached to the 'problem' of female adjustment and was almost totally 
feminized." See Emily Rosenberg, "'Foreign Affairs' After World War II: Connecting Sexual and 
International Politics," Diplomatic History 18,1 (Winter 1994): 67.
4 Y. B. Mangunwijaya, in his novel, Durga Umayi (1991) has also used the figure of an "abused, angry 
woman" to "enact symbolically the trajectory" of the Indonesian Republic's history; see Michael H. 
Bodden, "Woman as Nation in Mangunwijaya's Durga Umayi," Indonesia 62 (October, 1996): 69.
5 Or, as Spoor wrote in the Netherlands armed services magazine in Indonesia, Wapenbroeders, the 
"defenseless and submissive Indonesian people"; quoted by Ton Schilling, Spoor, onze generaal, door zijn 
vrienden en soldaten (Amsterdam: H. Meulenhoff, 1953), p. 78.
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lated, and acted upon their newly discovered intellectual and physical confidence or 
"self-sacrificing valor."6
In this context, the specific date of Spoor's memorandum is highly relevant. He 
wrote his story at a time when the Republic's defenders had shocked and bewildered 
most of their former Dutch colonial overlords with an unprecedented display of 
toughness. Their sudden vigor could be defined as masculine in character, as if they 
had evolved into a novel "species of Super-Indonesians."7 Since independence had 
made its "radiant entrance" and provoked an "epidemic rage for politics" in August, 
1945, as Pramoedya Ananta Toer described the situation in his short story Dia jang 
menjerah (She Who Gave Up), the Republic's protectors appeared to have absorbed a 
brand new identity.8 As a result, they perceived themselves and their fellow 
revolutionaries as liberated, at long last, from Dutch colonial inscriptions of 
effeminacy.
Nonetheless, Spoor still invoked metaphors of gender and pathology that found 
their origins in the language of Dutch colonial mastery. This discourse, in turn, was 
inflected by the legacy of the European Enlightenment, which had yielded in the 
modem era a characterization of indigenous peoples in Asia as fragile creatures, in 
desperate need of masculine guidance from the West. Secondly, Spoor's statements 
about his antagonists also hinted at the psychoanalytic language invented by Sigmund 
Freud, whose ideas about sexuality and neurosis had entered the imaginative world of 
many reasonably educated Europeans and Americans in the post-World War II period. 
A third influence on Spoor's story derived from the rhetoric of the newly created 
United Nations, which formulated the hope that every country in the world would join 
"The Family of Nations" and submit to the UN Security Council's arbitration instead 
of resorting to armed struggle in order to resolve conflict.
But Spoor's parable, perhaps unwittingly, reflected Indonesians' new intractability, 
too, because he represented the Republic as a thoroughly modern woman who was 
firm and feisty instead of soft and submissive. His report began as follows:
Speaking in the House of Commons in December 1946, Mr. Churchill said with 
reference to India: 'If either bride or bridegroom fails to appear in church, the 
result is not what one would call a unilateral marriage. It is absolutely essential 
that both parties be present.'
The present situation in Indonesia is even more unsatisfactory than the 
contingency described by Mr. Churchill. The bride not only refuses to appear in 
church; no, she has induced her friends and the best man to institute proceedings 
in court against the bridegroom; she allows her admirers to commence all sorts of 
unusual and unseemly acts in her bridegroom's house; she belies and deceives
6 Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 1944-1946 (Ithaca/London: Cornell University 
Press, 1972), p. 31.
7 Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, "Verwerking en koloniaal trauma," Bzzlletin 228 (September, 1995), pp. 3-8; P. 
M. Van Wulftten Palthe, Psychological Aspects of the Indonesian Problem (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1949), p. 46.
8 Henk Maier, et al., translate the title of this story as "Resignation" (Berusting), in Harry Poeze and Henk 
Schulte Nordholt, eds., De roep om merdeka. Indonesische vrijheidslievende teksten uit de twintigste eeuw 
(Amsterdam/The Hague: Jan Mets/NOVIB, 1995), p. 117; Benedict R. O'G Anderson, "Language, Fantasy, 
Revolution: Java, 1900-1950," in Daniel S. Lev and Ruth McVey, eds, Making Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell 
Southeast Asia Program, Studies on Southeast Asia, No. 20,1996), p. 38.
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him, engages constantly in flirtations with adventurous suitors, and has even 
allowed herself to be ensnared by a great-uncle, a real bear of a man, who is after 
her innocence and wealth. As if that were not enough, she contests the validity of 
the marriage settlement, although it was drawn up with the most scrupulous care, 
never hesitating at the same time to invoke the document when alleging fear that 
her bridegroom is about to assault her. Finally, she has shown such peculiar 
leanings in the field of business that the bridegroom and his family, and in fact the 
friends of both parties, have been utterly shocked thereby. In short: the bride's 
mental equipment appears to be slightly out of order.
Normally the marriage would, of course, not take place. She would be 
entrusted to the care of a few competent doctors, who in all probability would 
suggest a period of treatment in a center for neurotic patients under the guidance 
and supervision of some husky nurses. On his part, the bridegroom would look 
for another bride, perhaps—so as to create the least possible scandal—from the 
mentally more normal sisters of the bride. But the Family Council—a family 
[council] with the widest ramifications throughout the whole world—has decided 
that, willy-nilly, the wedding has to take place, and to that end it has engaged a 
firm of lawyers rather than a neurologist, in order to keep the bride away from the 
sensuous great-uncle if at all possible, binding her at the same time to her groom 
by another marriage-settlement. Small wonder that each day the latter feels more 
uncomfortable.9
The Context and Meanings of General Spoor's Story
At the time Spoor wrote his introduction, efforts to resolve the Dutch-Indonesian 
conflict by diplomatic means had reached yet another impasse. "Stubborn, reciprocal 
distrust" continued to hamper the negotiations, especially after Dutch military forces 
had mounted a full-scale attack on the Indonesian Republic in late July, 1947.10 This 
first Colonial War—or "police action," as the Dutch labeled it euphemistically—had 
provoked a resolution of the UN Security Council on August 26,1947, which signaled 
the beginning of the United Nations' formal involvement in the Indonesian Question 
through its Committee of Good Offices (GOC) and later, the United Nations 
Commission on Indonesia (UNCI).11
Under the auspices of American, Australian, and Belgian representatives to the 
GOC, a cease-fire accord had been signed on board the USS Renville in January 1948. 
The Renville settlement, however, proved to be "a lemon," as one of the US foreign 
service officers intimately involved in the deliberations, Charlton Ogburn, 
remembered many years later. It should have been called "the Renville non­
agreement," Ogburn wrote in 1985, because the Dutch signed it with "one
9 "Relevant portion of a confidential report," September 13,1948, RG 59, Box No. 6440,856D.00/10-848, 
NAIL
10 "Statement of Senator [Frank Porter] Graham on the Indonesian Situation," April 5,1949, Congressional 
Record - Senate (1949) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office) 81st Congress, 1st session, No. 95, 
1949, p. 3922.
11 See Robert McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian 
Independence, 1945-49 (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 181-209, for a detailed 
discussion.
Languages of Gender and Neurosis 49
understanding" and the Republic's leaders with "quite another."12 As a result, the 
murky compromise reached on board the USS Renville produced little more than a 
litany of formal complaints.
The bulk of Spoor's chronicle was typical of this acrimonious pattern; it constituted 
yet another Dutch attempt to call the attention of the GOC and, indirectly, American 
policy makers, to the Indonesian Republic's infractions of the Renville truce. These 
reports consisted of English translations of strategic directives issued by the Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia (TNI), the official army of the Indonesian Republic, which Holland's 
Military Intelligence Service claimed to have confiscated. In Dutch narratives, such 
violations were perpetrated not only by the TNI, but also by armed civilian squads— 
"bands of gangsters," the Netherlands representative to the UN Security Council in 
Lake Success called them—consisting of young men who harbored a passionate loyalty 
to the Republic.13
Sporting colorful names such as Beruang Merah (Red Bears), Barisan Gorila (Gorilla 
Guards), Harimau Liar (Wild Tigers), or Banteng Hitam (Black Bulls), and equipped with 
left-over Japanese guns, samurai swords, machetes, spears, and all sorts of home-made 
weapons, these groups of fiery freedom fighters engaged in surprise attacks on Dutch 
military patrols. Such irregular crews of revolutionaries (pemuda) also raided 
European-owned plantations and allegedly coerced peasants in village communities 
outside Republican territory into providing them with food and shelter. Many of the 
Dutch protests filed with the GOC emphasized that Indonesians' incursions always 
occurred with either the full "backing" or at least the implicit "knowledge" of the 
Republican leadership in Yogyakarta.14
Every now and then, Netherlands officials were quite imaginative when conveying 
the statements of Republican politicians, whose communications they tried to intercept 
as often as possible. Dutch accounts purporting to describe the serious threat that 
communism posed to the Republic were equally inventive. Some American diplomats, 
however, learned to read in between the lines of such ominous tales. The US cultural 
attache in Batavia, Willard Anderson Hanna, noted in September 1949, for instance, 
that the "grave danger" of communism was nothing but "a figment of the Dutch
12 Personal letter from Charlton Ogbum to Gerlof D. Homan, circa August 20,1985, p. 3.
13 George E. Jones, "UN Seeks Way to Help Indonesia," New York Times, August 22,1947, p. 3, Quoted by 
Paul F. Gardner, Shared Hopes, Separate Fears: Fifty Years ofUS-lndonesian Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1997), p. 38.
14 Van Wulfften Palthe, Psychological Aspects, p. 45. Anthony J. S. Reid, "The Revolution in Regional 
Perspective," in J. van Goor, ed., The Indonesian Revolution: Papers of the Conference held in Utrecht, June 17- 
20,1986, Utrechtse Historische Cahiers, 7 ,2 /3  (1986), has noted that the pemuda rank-and-file were 
"distinctly amorphous" and that recruitment was unrelated to age, pp. 188-189; "Operatie order No.
1 / stop/48 (Perintah Siasat)," June 12,1948, from Panglima Besar Sudirman to Sukarno, Hatta, and high 
army commanders regarding "Wingate Actions." The Netherlands' Central Military Intelligence Service 
(CMI) seized this report from Mohammad Hatta's personal archives in the wake of the second police 
action in December, 1948. The Dutch delegation to the GOC used Sudirman's communication with Hatta 
as one example, among many others, to prove that the government in Yogyakarta was fully aware of the 
Republic's truce violations. Yogya Dokumen, No. 5319, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta (hereafter ANJ).
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imagination," which they tried to substantiate by spreading leaflets and posters that 
were outright forgeries or "flagrant Dutch publicity stunts."15
Hence, Lieutenant-General Spoor's narrative belonged to a diplomatic genre in 
which both sides in the conflict had become quite adept. The Indonesian Republic's 
politicians also submitted a steady stream of grievances to the UN committee in 
Batavia, accusing the Royal Netherlands Army of similar transgressions. Both the 
Dutch delegation to the GOC and its Indonesian counterpart began to resemble 
antagonistic schoolboys, who represented their competitors' behavior in the worst 
possible light to their teacher. On May 20,1948, for example, a memorandum arrived 
at the GOC offices in Jakarta which bore the headline "Dutch terrors and barbarities"; 
it quoted from Merdeka, a publication issued by the Indonesian Information Service in 
Bombay, India. A list of atrocities followed: the Dutch "massacre of forty thousand 
Indonesians in South Celebes, their suffocation of forty-six Indonesian prisoners-of- 
war . . .  in a railroad car [at Bondowoso], the machine-gunning of three hundred 
Indonesians at Rawah Gedeh, the burning alive of Indonesians in Bandung, etc." These 
appalling events, which were more than mere allegations, happened after the Renville 
accord had been signed. To Republican partisans, it was self-evident that none of these 
agreements "have deterred the Dutch fascists from their inhumanities."16 General 
Spoor, for his part, admitted to a group of journalists in Holland in January 1948, that 
"of course" his troops committed truce violations, too, because "we are not saints!"17
The Indonesian side also tended to embellish the complaints it lodged against the 
Dutch in Java and Sumatra. In fact, UN administrators in Batavia—or the battery of 
UN military observers in the field (MILOBS)—had been placed in a role much more 
complicated than that of a schoolmaster having to cope with a flood of accusations 
unleashed by two querulous schoolboys. The task of UN officials was more akin to the 
therapeutic burdens of a psychiatrist, charged with restraining the behavior of two 
patients who were stuck in a pattern of aggression and paranoia.
Spoor's introductory paragraphs, however, distinguished his narrative from the 
avalanche of reports that had preceded and would follow it. In his introduction he 
used a model of marriage and the family—and its inherent conflicts and 
permutations—as a rhetorical devise designed to "naturalize relationships of unequal 
power."18 By transforming the conflict between the Indonesian Republic and its 
colonial rulers from the Netherlands into a neurotic family drama, he appealed to a
15 Willard A. Hanna to Glenn A. Abbey, “Observations Made on My Visit to Jogjakarta (Sept. 8 -13) 
Regarding the Political Situation in The Republic," forwarded to the Secretary of State by Glenn A. Abbey, 
No. 329, September 19,1949, RG 59, Box 6442, 856D.00/9-1949, NA H. It is likely that the Consulate's 
political officer, Glenn Abbey, disagreed with Hanna's report because he was convinced that the Republic 
was a hotbed of communism.
16 Netherlands Delegation (Security Committee) to the GOC, signed Major-General D.C. Buurman van 
Vreeden, May 20,1948, No. 935, quoting from Merdeka, Nos. 17-18, March 30,1948. DAG13/2.0.0./#4, 
Archives of Missions and Commissions, subgroup 13: Good Offices Committee (GOC) and UN 
Commission for Indonesia (UNCI), United Nations Archives, New York City (hereafter UN Archives, 
NYC). Ironically, this version was submitted to the GOC by the Dutch delegation in another attempt to 
subvert or ridicule the claims made by the Indonesian Delegation to the GOC; see also Ad Van Liempt De 
Lijkentrein. Waarom 46 Gevangenen de reis naar Surabaya niet overleefden (The Hague: Sdu, 1997).
17 Quoted by Schilling, Spoor, onze generaal, p. 136.
18 Costigliola, "The Nuclear Family," Diplomatic History, p. 163.
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residual knowledge about conjugal unions between women and man and other 
kinship ties. Such relationships were eminently recognizable, regardless of the social 
sensibilities or cultural background of his story's readers.
Identifying the players in Spoor's narrative is an intriguing game. As an army 
officer with extensive military experience in the Indies during the 1920s and 1930s, he 
had assimilated Europeans' tendency to view their colonial subjects in Java and 
elsewhere as effeminate and childlike. This vision often implied, as was the case with 
British representations of Bengali men, that they lacked "manly virility." In such 
colonial constructions, feminine characteristics were projected onto native men and 
served as a proxy for passivity and weakness, which contrasted with sturdy 
Dutchmen, who possessed the masculine energy to rule the Indonesian archipelago.19
Spoor, however, transformed the supposedly delicate Javanese, who supplied the 
Republic's largest percentage of soldiers and politicians fighting against the 
reimposition of Dutch colonial rule, into a hysterical woman, about to be forced into a 
marriage to a Dutchman she despised and had long since rejected as a lover. But she 
needed to safeguard her future livelihood and economic interests. Despite the 
revulsion she felt for the bridegroom, she recognized that it might be expedient to 
continue her negotiations with the Dutchman and his family, even if she questioned 
the validity of the latest prenuptial agreement drafted on board of the USS Renville. 
Nonetheless, it was the only document to which she could appeal in moments of 
danger, when her spumed suitor had become so irate that he threatened to assault her.
At the same time, Spoor announced that the Dutch bridegroom hoped to make yet 
another attempt at an advantageous marital settlement with the bride, in a ceremony 
to be officiated by the anointed representatives of the world community of nations. 
After centuries of living in sin with his Indonesian nyai (concubine), he was finally 
prepared to make an honest married woman out of her. The suitor may still have 
harbored either a secret passion or a begrudging love for his mistress, now 
reconfigured as a newly emancipated fiance who tried to defy the dictates of an 
arranged marriage. Above all, he wanted to preserve his access to her luxurious 
wealth. Her fortune, after all, had given the Dutchman and his relatives a delightful 
free ride in the past.
But the bride, Spoor intimated, continued to balk; she induced her friends and 
cousins, whether they hailed from India, Pakistan, Egypt, or Australia, into 
participating in "unseemly acts" while helping her to escape from the clutches of the 
despised groom. She also pleaded with the wedding's "best man" from America to 
defend her honor in the court of world opinion. Besides, the Republican bride allowed 
herself to be "ensnared" by "a real bear of man": her robust great uncle in the Soviet
19 Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the ‘Effeminate Bengali' in the Late 
Nineteenth Century (Manchester/New York: University of Manchaster Press, 1995), p. 19; Gail Ching-Liang 
Low, in "His Stories? Narratives and Images of Imperialism," in Erica Carter, James Wishart, and Judith 
Squires, eds., Space & Place. Theories of Identity and Location (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1993), also 
approaches imperialism as a "culture of masculinity," p. 188. The best known example of this tendency in 
Dutch colonial literature is Louis Couperus's novel, The Hidden Force (Amsterdam, 1900; trans. London, 
1922, reprint Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1985). It should be noted here that other ethnic 
groups in the Indonesian archipelago were inscribed with manly attributes, such as the fierce Acehnese 
fighters in north Sumatra or the bold Buginese sailors in southern Sulawesi.
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Union.20 She did so because he might be able to strengthen her bargaining power in 
the prenuptial negotiations or, perhaps, because she was not entirely impervious to his 
avuncular charm.
General Spoor suggested that most members of the family were extremely alarmed, 
due to the appearance of a Republican dalliance with the Russian great uncle. They 
also feared that the Indonesian bride had been mishandling her economic affairs in an 
immature fashion, ever since she began to extricate herself from her Dutch fiance.21 By 
ascribing "peculiar leanings" to her in the field of business, Spoor may have alluded to 
an offer of being adopted by a shrewd American entrepreneur named Matthew Fox.22 
But every relative wanted to benefit from her fabulous wealth on a continuous basis. If 
she were to give Mr. Fox predominant access to her assets—treasures consisting of oil, 
rubber, tin, tobacco, and other valuable raw materials—or squander them in other 
ways, the whole family would be left out in the cold. In fact, some among them had 
become convinced that the Republican woman had taken leave of her senses.
Given these circumstances, Commander-in-Chief Spoor proposed that any form of 
settlement should be postponed indefinitely until she could regain her sanity. For the 
time being, the unstable Republican female should be committed to a "center for 
neurotic patients" staffed with "husky nurses," if only to prevent her from engaging in 
foolish actions. This would give the "best man" in Washington DC some respite, by 
allowing him to straddle the imperialist fence a little longer. The bride's temporary 
commitment to a mental institution would enable American foreign policy makers to 
continue their walk along the "tightrope," as a personal friend of US Secretary of State, 
Dean Acheson, formulated it in March 1949, they had rigged up between their long­
standing support of an old friend, the Dutch groom, and their new concerns with 
securing the loyalty of the Indonesian bride, even if "some of the strands of the 
tightrope are actually rotten."23
While she would be hospitalized in a psychiatric clinic, General Spoor speculated 
that the Dutch bridegroom could perhaps find a pliable spouse among her "mentally 
more normal" sisters, all of whom were called negara (lit. state; in the context of Spoor's
20 Costigliola, in "The Nuclear Family," Diplomatic History, has shown that US foreign policymakers used 
a similar language of predatory sexual prowess when describing the Soviet Union during the Cold War,
p. 166.
21 This attitude persisted through the Round Table Conference. "Although politically the Indonesian^]. . .  
have shown themselves very well prepared and astute bargainers, economically they are Tike children/" 
Arthur R. Ringwalt's dispatch No. 1565, entitled "Indonesia," from the US Embassy in London to the 
Secretary of State, October 3,1949, RG 59, Box No. 6442,856D.00/10-349, NAII.
22 See the report from Sumitro Djojohadikusumo in New York to the Indonesian Republic's government, 
"State Department's attitude towards the Indonesian Question in general and our agreement with 
Matthew Fox in particular," April 26,1948, Yogya Dokumen, No. 5314, ANJ. John Coast, in Recruit to 
Revolution: Adventure and Politics in Indonesia (London: Christophers, 1952), wrote about Sumitro that he 
was "bespectacled, quick, slick, intelligent." Coast described "Matty" Fox as "bald, plump, eager-eyed, 
romantic, emotional, a film wizard, a financial juggler, who with typical American bigheartedness wanted 
to adopt Indonesia—a dangerous psychological attitude to a sensitive and proud people," p. 125.
23 Personal, undated letter addressed to "Dear Dean" from Louis B. Wehle, a Wall Street lawyer, to 
Secretary of State Acheson, "re: Indonesia," received on March 28,1949, RG 59, Box No. 6441,856D.00/3- 
2849, NA II. Dean Acheson had become Secretary of State, succeeding George C. Marshall, on January 20, 
1949.
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story, negara referred to the different regions of the Indonesian archipelago that 
entertained a continuing colonial relationship with the Netherlands, separate from the 
Indonesian Republic). If the Dutchman played his cards right, the sisters might grant 
him a perpetual share in the abundant resources owned by the bride and her siblings. 
Hence, he progressed from his "disgusting flirtations" with several negara sisters who 
did little more than "sing Dutch songs"—as the thoughtful Dutch negotiator with 
Republican politicians, Willem Schermerhom, recorded in his fastidious diary—to an 
unabashed search for a series of mistresses who might be an alternative to the 
Republican bride.24
Indeed, while trying to isolate the Republican bride, the Dutch groom moved into a 
promiscuous mode. In the process of creating the United States of Indonesia, he set up 
a polygamous, neo-colonial household with the most docile among the Indonesian 
Republic's sisters. The architecture of this polyglot residence in Indonesia was 
designed to "exclude" the intractable Republican bride from entering his new mansion; 
he also tried to cut her off financially.25 But his efforts would fail. Eventually, as a 
progressive newspaper in Amsterdam reported, it would become clear that the 
Dutchman's house was constructed on "quicksand" and would prove a ramshackle 
building, structurally unsound on the inside as well as the outside.26
To Spoor's dismay, the UN Security Council wielded a wide-ranging authority 
over family members scattered among the many comers of the globe, and it bore the 
economic interests and political aspirations of distant relatives in mind. Temporarily 
residing in the town of Lake Success on Long Island, while awaiting its move to newly 
constructed UN buildings in New York City, the family's fractious Security Council 
was dominated by the US "best man" and his allies. But it also counted among its
24 C. Smit, ed., Het dagboek van Schermerhom. Geheim verslag van Prcf. ir. W. Schermerhom als voorzitter der 
commissie-generaal voor Nederlands-Indie, 20 September 1946 tot 7 oktober, 1947, vol. 2 (Groningen: Wolters 
Noordhoff, 1970), p. 755.
25 Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, 'Renville' als keerpunt in de Nederlands-lndonesische onderhandelingen 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff, 1980), p. 223.
26 The word "quicksand" was used in "The Fiasco is Now Nearly Completed—On the Way to 
Destruction," an editorial in Het Parool, March 15,1949, sent by Counselor Robert D. Coe in US Embassy in 
The Hague to Secretary of State, "Transmitting Leftist Labor Editorial on Indonesia Problem," March 22, 
1949, RG 59, Box No. 6441, 856D.00/3-2249, NAII.
Regarding internal divisions in the Dutch military efforts at re-colonizing Indonesia, the British 
charge d'affaires informed a US Foreign Service officer in Nanking, China, in July, 1946, that morale in the 
Netherlands Army was low, because "there were 673 white Dutch troops hospitalized in Surabaya with 
self-inflicted wounds." Taken from incoming telegram from Nanking, signed Smyth, July 6,1946, RG 59, 
Box 6439, 856D.00/7-646, NA II. By early 1949, the discontent of Dutch soldiers had allegedly progressed 
from "self-inflicted wounds" to a full-fledged "mutiny of the Dutch army." A Republican Radio Broadcast 
from West Sumatra reported that "213 Dutch soldiers from the Royal Netherlands Army [KL] and the 
Royal Netherlands Indies Army [KNIL], stationed at Bukit Tinggi, were shot dead for revolting against 
their Army Command . . .  resulting in a gloomy and strained atmosphere"; in addition, "Fifty Dutch 
soldiers from the 'Blauwe Pijpers' Unit surrendered to the Republican guerillas in the Karo region." 
Reported in Merdeka, Indonesian Information Service (25 Rifle Street, Colombo 2, Ceylon), vol. II, no. 3, 
February 20,1949. In RG 165, Records of the War Department, General and Special Staffs, Military 
Intelligence Division, Regional File Netherlands East Indies, Box 2634, NA II.
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members a range of dissenting voices, speaking in either Polish or Russian, which 
contested America's patriarchal power.27
Nevertheless, the Council decided that in order to protect the wealthy bride from 
lustful, bear-like figures such as the Soviet great uncle, some form of compromise 
between the quarreling couple had to be secured. Council members clung to this vision 
because the suitor from Holland had earned his spurs as a crafty businessman; in the 
past, he had administered his concubine's vast wealth with great efficiency, while 
allowing his uncles and cousins to share in the lavish profits generated by her fertile 
soil.28 Hence, instead of locating a competent psychiatrist, the family's Council in Lake 
Success hired a firm of wily attorneys. This pack of lawyers was instructed to provide 
their "Good Offices" and bully the rebellious bride and agitated groom into some kind 
of marital arrangement once again.
Here the fable ended. The Commander-in-Chief composed his curious introduction 
on September 13, 1948, a mere five days before an uprising, orchestrated by radical 
organizations on the "crossroads of the left," which opposed the Republican 
government's policies, took place in the city of Madiun in central Java.29 Owing to their 
decisive action against the rebels in Madiun, Sukarno and Hatta managed to convince 
the State Department in Washington DC and observers in western Europe of their anti­
communist credentials, despite Dutch propaganda depicting Republican leaders as 
political extremists, who were entirely beholden to directives from Moscow. Spoor, for 
his part, invoked family rhetoric yet again. He described the Madiun revolt as a 
dispute between brothers (broedertwist).30
The Republican government's forceful suppression of the insurrection in Madiun 
renewed America's involvement in trying to reach a diplomatic solution brokered by 
emissaries of the UN Security Council. But soon thereafter, the feverish negotiations to 
reach a Dutch-Indonesian settlement stalled again. As a result, on December 19,1948, 
Spoor and his troops were instructed to mount another military attack on the 
Yogyakarta Republic, resulting in the arrest of the top leaders of the Indonesian 
Republic and their incarceration on the island of Bangka. Rather than being able to rest 
on his laurels, though, he noted with growing frustration that the Dutch military 
assault on the Indonesian Republic's life seemed to constitute a moment of reckoning 
for observers abroad. Most countries, whether they belonged to the American or the 
Soviet bloc, finally realized that it was unlikely that the Indonesian Republic and the 
Netherlands would ever be able to coexist, even if their liaison would be constructed as 
a "loose relationship," a "light union," or a "soft link."31
27 Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-1948 (Lake Success, New York: Department of Public Information, 
United Nations, 1949), pp. 363-364.
28 See the general discussion of Gerlof D. Homan, "American Business Interests in the Indonesian 
Republic, 1946-1949," Indonesia 35 (April, 1983): 125-132.
29 For a recently published analysis, based on his 1968 MA thesis, see Soe Hok Gie, Orang-orang di 
Persimpangan Kiri Jalan: Kisah Pemberontakan Madiun September 1948 (Yogyakarta:Yayasan Budaya Bentang, 
1997).
Quoted by Petra H. M. Groen, Marsroutes en dwaalsporen. Het Nederlands militair-strategisch beleid in 
Indonesia, 1945-1950 (The Hague: Sdu, 1991), p. 137.
31 The phrase "loose relationship" was attributed to the conservative Dutch politician C. P. M. Romme; see 
US Ambassador Herman Baruch in The Hague to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 274, reporting on a
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Spoor's blitzkrieg on behalf of the Netherlands had obviously failed to produce the 
desired outcome. Instead of prompting the Republican leaders to accommodate by 
allowing Dutch administrators to take over the economic and political management of 
the archipelago again, the Indonesian Republic had emerged as a hapless victim of 
Holland's military aggression. In the eyes of allies overseas, Dutch behavior had gone 
beyond the pale of propriety. According to George Kennan's influential Policy 
Planning Staff in the US State Department, it comprised an "incredible piece of Dutch 
stupidity" which had antagonized most of Holland's allies and business partners.32
Due to a worldwide condemnation of the Dutch military action, General Spoor was 
forced to concede that the attempt to create a Dutch-Indonesian Commonwealth had 
been jeopardized. At the same time, the Security Council prodded the increasingly self- 
confident Republic and the chastened colonial rulers from the Netherlands to settle 
their division of property. Some Dutch politicians admitted, meanwhile, that their 
actions had been "stupid and arrogant" because they had "flouted world public 
opinion."33 At the Round Table Conference in The Hague the two parties finalized 
their separation agreement. In late December 1949, the Indonesian Republic received 
complete freedom after its political leaders as well as the Dutch government had 
"jumped" through a large number of "hoops" held up by the United States.34
Sources of General Spoor's Gendered Language
This parable provides a novel perspective on the birth of an independent Indonesia 
as well as the role played by the United States. In the starkly gendered imagery of the 
report's introduction, the Netherlands emerged as a "manly" nation; so did the US, 
through its paternalistic position within the UN Security Council. America had been 
called upon to referee the conflict, even though America as a "trans-ocean patron," in 
the text of the Soviet publication Red Star, would probably reduce Indonesia to a 
"puppet" in the exact same way as the Netherlands had done.35 The Indonesian 
Republic was "demonized" as a quintessential female, who engaged in all sorts of 
devious tricks while trying to disentangle herself from a loathsome suitor. In the eyes
conversation with Romme, then the leader of the Catholic Faction (KVP) in the Second Chamber, March 
23,1949, RG 59, Box No. 644, 856D.00/3-2349. "Light Union" was the formulation of a Netherlands 
Embassy official in Washington DC, H. A. Helb, in Memorandum of Conversation with Frederick Nolting, 
"Indonesian Developments and Netherlands-US Cooperation," June 15,1949, RG 59, Box No. 6441, 
856D.00/6-1549, NAII. The phrase "The link between the Netherlands and its former colonies, however 
'soft' it might be," was used by Ali Sastroamidjojo in a letter to Frank Porter Graham, April 2,1949, 
Graham Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
32 As George Kennan's Policy Planning Staff referred to the second police action in a draft policy paper on 
southeast Asia, February 28,1949, in folder labeled "Policy Papers (miscellaneous)," RG 59, Philippines 
and Southeast Asian Affairs Office (hereafter PSA), Box No. 5. In the final National Security Council's 
policy paper No. 51, "US Policy Towards Southeast Asia," this phrase was replaced with "this Dutch 
course of action" in RG 59, PSA, Box No. 7. NA II.
33 US Ambassador Herman Baruch in The Hague to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 523, June 17,1949, 
RG 59, Box No. 6441, 856D.00/6-1749, NA II.
34 Memorandum of Conversation between E. L. C. Schiff, Second Secretary of Netherlands Embassy in 
Washington, DC, and J. W. Scott of the Northern European Division, July 11,1949, RG 59, Box No. 6441, 
856D.00/7-1149, NA II.
35 Observer, "Conference in The Hague (The Traitors Unmasked)," Red Star, August 27,1949, translation 
sent by US Embassy in Moscow to Secretary of State, No. 506, RG 59, Box No. 6442,856D.00/9-349, NA II.
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of some Dutchmen, meanwhile, President Sukarno's reputation for narcissism and 
emotionality may have functioned as a symbolic confirmation of the Republic's 
supposedly feminine character.36
By recasting his enemy as female, Spoor tried to convince himself that his army 
could destroy the Republic with no effort at all. He apparently "boasted" that he could 
"break down the whole Republic within a week."37 However cunning she might be, a 
woman who dared to fight with real men would quickly bite the dust, presumably 
because she possessed neither a killer instinct nor the requisite physical strength. One 
could speculate, in fact, that Spoor's imaginings about the Republic as a woman 
prompted him to underestimate its military muscle. Thinking of his enemy as feminine 
and frail may also have caused him to exaggerate the ease with which the Netherlands 
army could overpower the Republic.38
The most pathetic figure in his story, of course, was the browbeaten Dutch fiance, 
misunderstood by the outside world and driven to despair by the feminine antics of 
his intended. But this portrayal fitted into Spoor's amateur interests in psychology or 
gendered archetypes. He had described the first American delegate to the UN Security 
Council's GOC, Frank Porter Graham, for example, as suffering from "a well-known 
sentimentality complex known as underdog sympathy."39 During the Fall of 1947 he 
had offered the opinion that the relationship between a skillful military commander 
and his soldiers should resemble the empathetic "bond between a father and his sons." 
In contrast, a bad army general was one who envisioned his role as a "majestic leader," 
in charge of legions of devoted followers in. order to secure their "adolatry." This type 
of military commander would accomplish little, because he did nothing but cultivate a 
"powerful feminine-hysterical element."40
An example of such a perverse leader was Hitler, Spoor argued, because he had 
presented himself as a "grand seducer: mysterious Adolf, who made the hysterical 
Gretchen's head spin." In the case of Nazi-Germany's military rank and file, too, he 
depicted the enemy as a woman. Symbolizing Hitler's "mesmerized" disciples, Spoor 
asserted that "Gretchen-in-uniform" had been an incompetent soldier. Because Hitler
36 Susan Jeffords has argued that in many national histories, enemies have often been "demonized as 
feminine," while domestic heroes are celebrated as "manly," in "Commentary: Culture and National 
Identity in US Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 18,1 (Winter 1994): 92; Joop van den Berg, et al., 
"President Soekamo: Portret van een aartsvijand," Bzzlletin 228 (September, 1995): 9-21.
37 Quoted in Letter No. 13 from Louis Damais in Jakarta to Claire Holt in Washington DC, May 28-31,
1946.1 am grateful to Deena Burton for giving me access to these remarkable letters and to Adji Damais 
for granting me permission to quote them.
38 UN Military Observers (MILOBS) informed the GOC in June, 1948, that Spoor's army might be able to 
occupy Yogyakarta, but would not have the necessary strength to pacify the entire Republican territory. 
When Spoor learned of this assessment, he dismissed it as "nonsense"; quoted by Groen, Marsroutes en 
dwaalsporen, p. 131.
39 Hubertus van Mook to Eelco van Kleffens, January 21,1948, NIB, Vol. 12, p. 304; see also General Spoor 
to chief of staff, December 3,1947, NIB, vol. 12, p. 55, and Robert Lovett to US delegation to GOC,
February 13,1948, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), vol. 6 (Washington DC: State 
Department, 1948), p. 96.
40 Leonhard Huizinga, Gesprek met degeneraal (Amsterdam: P. N. van Kampen, 1952), pp. 13-14. Spoor's 
wife, meanwhile, was known to the troops as "Mother Spoor"; reported by Schilling, Spoor, onze generaal,
p. 112.
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had not offered himself as a benevolent military father, nurturing the courage of his 
"soldier-sons" for the sake of protecting the sanctity of the family, his troops had been 
transformed into dizzy creatures named "Gretchen." In the end, she had done little 
more than "sit behind her machine gun, fantasizing about the hero of her dreams!"41
In light of these bizarre ruminations, it is possible that Spoor subjected his own 
frustrations over Holland's precarious position in its southeast Asian colony to the 
same kind of peculiar analysis. Moreover, in September 1948, he also may have 
struggled with a sense of impotence he felt civil authorities imposed on him. After all, 
he was a zealous young soldier in the prime of his life, who pursued interests in music, 
literature, and psychology that transcended his narrow military existence. His personal 
library was filled with the collected works of western civilization's most significant 
thinkers, and through his lofty reading habits he strove for "spiritual perfection."42 
When faced with a difficult decision, he secluded himself for a few days to meditate 
and to play his beloved violin, a talent and passion for music he had inherited from his 
father, Andre Spoor, the concertmaster of Amsterdam's concertgebouw orchestra. A US 
Army Colonel went so far as to praise him as "the [Douglas] MacArthur of the 
Netherlands East Indies."43
But Spoor was also "vain and ambitious" and full of bravado. Although he was 
often applauded as a capable personnel manager and logistical organizer, his political 
views were those of "an old-guard colonial reactionary, bubbling over with impatience 
to play the role of Van Heutsz" in a modern guise.44 The legendary Dutch General Van 
Heutsz had defeated the rebellious Acehnese in northern Sumatra in a protracted 
guerrilla war around the turn of the century, and in 1948 Spoor hoped to destroy the 
Indonesian Republic in the same gallant way, albeit more quickly.
Spoor had taken over as commander-in-chief of the Dutch military establishment in 
Indonesia on January 31, 1946, an army described by one of his biographers as 
resembling an "Augean stable."45 But once he was placed in charge, the army grew in 
size as well as efficiency, and he had been chomping at the bit ever since to employ his 
troops and weapons. On various occasions he had advocated a military solution when 
diplomatic negotiations faltered. After the first formal confrontation with the 
Republic's military forces during the Summer of 1947, however, politicians in the 
Netherlands had not allowed him to use his army's resources aggressively to force the 
enemy into submission. Despite his command over a superior military might, he may 
have thought of himself as emasculated by cowardly politicians in The Hague.
Spoor's fortunes finally turned in mid-December 1948, when the Dutch 
government released him from his restraints and permitted him to unleash his soldiers
41 Huizinga, Gesprek met de generaal, pp. 14-15.
42 Schilling, Spoor, onze generaal, p. 65. See also Laurens van der Post, The Admiral's Baby: An Extraordinary 
Episode in Twentieth-Century History (New York: William Morrow, 1996), for a description of Spoor, p. 165.
43 Julius Tahiya, Horizon Beyond (Singapore/Kualalumpur: Times Books International, 1995), p. 68; US 
Army Colonel Collin S. Myers, HQ Far Eastern Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, 
quoted by Schilling, Spoor, onze generaal, p. 113.
44 D. M. G. Koch, Verantwoording: een halve eeuw in Indonesia (The Hague/Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1956), 
p. 264.
45 Schilling, Spoor, onze generaal, p. 30.
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and military hardware in an effort to subdue the Yogyakarta Republic. No longer 
bridled by civilian authorities, he managed to score a quick victory in the second so- 
called "police action," with only minor Dutch casualties. Fellow colonialists in England 
and France applauded his brisk, effective operation. As the London Times reported, 
Spoor's military maneuver produced "amazingly peaceful conditions" within two 
weeks, if only because 304 officers, who used to be the Indonesian Republic's loyal 
servants, allegedly surrendered to the Dutch occupation force. In a similar fashion, the 
French-language newspaper VEntente in Hanoi exalted General Spoor's swift action in 
Indonesia as "a brilliant and masterful stroke, superbly effective and . . .  in the best 
interest" of the Indonesian people.46
However, General Spoor's moment in the domestic and international limelight 
proved short-lived. The UN resolution denouncing his army's lightning assault on 
Yogyakarta, which the Security Council passed in late January 1949, quickly 
transformed him from a heroic warrior on behalf of European imperialism into a 
warmonger. Not surprisingly, ever since his appointment as a youthful commander of 
the Dutch military forces, he had lived in Indonesians' imagination as "the great 
monster" who was suspected of indulging a fondness for "devouring little children." 
But since the second Dutch attack on Yogyakarta, his reputation as the "big black 
beast" spread beyond the borders of the Indonesian Republic, which proved to be his 
own psychological undoing.47
During Spoor's honeymoon as commander-in-chief, the astute Willem Schermer- 
horn had already noted in his diary that every now and then Spoor elicited an 
impression among friends and foes that he was "abnormally nervous," "vitriolic," or 
"enraged."48 Later, Spoor would routinely "unburden his heart in a highly emotional 
fashion," another contemporary remembered.49 Initially, he had pleased Dutch civilian 
officials in Europe and southeast Asia as a more reasonable chief soldier than his 
predecessor.50 Starting in January 1949, however, a range of critics, at home or abroad, 
depicted him as a diabolic character, who had mounted a military campaign that did 
not come close to achieving the political goal it was supposed to accomplish. Spoor 
and his supporters had hoped to "decapitate" the Republic and reduce it to a status on 
a par with the other member states (negara) of the neo-colonial United States of 
Indonesia.51 Instead, the Republic had emerged in the imagination of the UN
46 London Times, January 6,1949; article handed by Van Kleffens to Lovett, January 10,1949, RG 59, Box 
No. 6440, 856D.00/1-1049 It should be noted that the English government, however, condemned the 
Dutch military action. See "My Grain of Salt by Paul Munier," VEntente, Hanoi, January 9,1949; see also 
William M. Gibson, US Consul in Hanoi, to the Secretary of State, January 14,1949, in report entitled 
"Comments of Hanoi Press concerning text of letter addressed by Under Secretary Lovett to Mr. Phillip 
Murray regarding Indonesia," RG 59, Box No. 6440, 856D.00/1-1449, NA II.
47 Het dagboek van Schermerhorn, vol. 1, p. 35; vol 2, p 753.
48 Het dagboek van Schermerhorn, vol. 1, pp. 407,421; vol. 2, pp. 753, 766.
49 Peter Schumacher, Ogenblikken van genezing. Indonesische ervaringen (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1996),
p. 181.
50 Van der Post, The Admiral's Baby, p. 167
51 The phrase "decapitation of the Republic" appears in Prof. Mr. P. S. Gerbrandy, De scheming van het rijk. 
Het drama van de Indonesische crisis (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1951), p. 194, and Ted Schouten, Dwaalsporen. 
Oorlogsmisdaden in Nederlands-Indie, 1945-1949 (Zutphen: De Walburg Press, 1995), p. 133.
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community of nations as a maiden in distress, in need of rescue by chivalrous 
outsiders.
When the dust settled, Spoor's mental strength disintegrated, and during the late 
Winter and Spring of 1949 he suffered from what may have been a nervous 
breakdown. His wife also collapsed physically; she returned to the Netherlands in 
March 1949 as an exhausted woman.52 Spoor thought that the human sacrifices of his 
troops had been rendered "senseless." His army, although undefeated on the 
battlefield, had been "stabbed in the back" in the most "disgusting" manner by 
politicians, whom he called "those scoundrels in The Hague."53 The same political 
cowards, he fulminated, had made a mockery of his role as commander-in-chief. They 
had ordered him to serve as nothing but a director of peons in a "shooting gallery." He 
felt utterly abandoned by the Dutch political establishment and a few of his senior 
adjutants in Indonesia.54 According to official press releases he died as a result of a 
sudden heart attack in late May. The media, whether in the Netherlands, Indonesia, or 
elsewhere, were mostly silent about the psychological demise that had preceded his 
death. Besides, even today rumor has it that his life's ending may have been caused by 
either suicide or poisoning.55
Neither Spoor's personal sense of impotence, which he may have felt was forced 
upon on him by craven civilians, nor his predilection to play the dilettante 
psychologist can fully elucidate the gendered dichotomies of his allegory. His 
depression in the wake of the Republic's effective guerrilla operations, the UN Security 
Council's sanctions, and the conclusion of a Dutch-Indonesian accord in early May 
1949—ordering Dutch troops to relinquish control of Yogyakarta—also cannot explain 
his gendered language in a compelling manner.56 Projecting mental illness on the 
Indonesian Republic in mid-September 1948, though, was perhaps more than merely a 
rhetorical gimmick. Similarly, the tacit support of the imperialist lobby in either 
England or France fails to explain his portrayal of Indonesia's independence struggle 
as a conflict between a deranged woman and a sensible man.
The General and his colleagues had already concocted a host of pejorative names 
for the Indonesian Republic; "den of iniquity," "source of contagion," or "diseased 
country" were some of the least offensive among them.57 By vilifying the Republic as
52 Schilling, Spoor, onze generaal, p. 105.
53 Quoted by Schouten, Dwaalsporen, pp. 162-163, and Schumacher, Ogetiblikken van genezing, pp. 180-182.
54 Quoted by Johannes A. Jonkman, Nederland en Indonesia beide vrij; memoires van mr J A Jonkman (Assen: 
Van Gorcum, 1977), pp. 84,112.
55 Schumacher, Ogenblikken van genezing, pp. 181-182. According to former Prime Minister P. S.
Gerbrandy, "Spoor was lowered into his grave because he was a victim of the pacifism of the Dutch 
cabinet in the face of the Soekarno-Hatta clique"; in De scheuring van bet rijk, p. 198. Schilling, in Spoor, onze 
generaal, provides a touching description of Spoor's sudden heart attack and his final two days, pp. 157- 
159. See also S. M. Smulders, Een stem uit het veld. Herinneringen van de Ritmiester-Adjudant van Generaal S.
H. Spoor (Amsterdam: De Bataafse Leeuw, 1988), p. 117.
56 After the conclusion of the Van Royen-Rum accord, a heart-broken Spoor apparently locked himself in 
his office with his head buried in his hands for several days, asking God "to help his soldiers." Reported 
by Schilling, Spoor, onze generaal, p. 145.
57 Anak Agung, Renville als keerpunt, p. 52; Wim Homman, De laatste man. Mariniers in degordel van 
smaragd, 1942-1950 (Bergen: Bonneville, 1992), p. 289.
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an unstable woman, Spoor added the figure of gender to the tropes of pathology. 
Obviously, he did not conjure up these themes out of thin air. Instead, his narrative 
incorporated strains of metaphorical language that derived from a variety of sources.
The Indonesian Republic as The Daughter of the Enlightenment
The first source of these feminine and masculine figures of speech can be found in 
eighteenth-century western Europe, when explorers began to describe the "exotic" 
peoples they encountered in Asia, South America, or Africa as unenlightened children 
whom they often represented as helpless little girls. This earliest influence modulating 
the tone of Spoor's allegory harked back to a set of parental metaphors that had been 
employed in many colonial settings since the European Enlightenment. While Western 
travelers during the Renaissance had viewed native people as "heathen" barbarians 
who belonged to the realm of demonology, chroniclers during the eighteenth century 
began to describe non-Europeans, above all, as defenseless creatures. The so-called 
primitive mind represented the infancy of the human spirit, which had reached its 
apex in Europeans' intellectual capacities. After all, native people almost everywhere 
failed to recognize the primacy of reason and logic by invoking spirits or appealing to 
magic.58
These portrayals of non-Europeans as not-yet-educated children—in fact, some 
observers, echoing John Locke, envisioned them as blank slates—eventually gave birth 
to a more wide-ranging set of gendered tropes. This novel idiom tended to represent 
European imperialists as mature, fatherly men, while depicting colonized people in 
Asia as guileless children who needed paternal protection and guidance. Europeans 
suspected, however, that indigenous men treated their wives and daughters as chattel 
or abused them as beasts of burden. Hence, colonizers often projected the status of 
innocent victim on to native peoples, regardless of gender, by inscribing them with 
feminine traits. In this manner Europeans could justify colonial mastery as a humane 
gesture, dedicated to the sheltering of hapless people from exploitation by patriarchal 
indigenous elites.
A next logical step was to characterize the entire Eastern half of the globe as an 
intrinsically female space, populated by fragile creatures in desperate need of powerful 
masculine guidance from the West, as if the Occident and the Orient belonged together 
as husband and wife. In these constructions, the West emerged as strong, energetic, 
and rational, while the East was weak, languorous, and emotional.59 Thus, Spoor's 
reliance on images of masculinity and femininity in portraying the relationship 
between robust colonizers from the Netherlands and the supposedly delicate 
population of the Indonesian archipelago was far from unique.
Scores of Europeans who resided in colonial settler societies constantly attempted 
to legitimize both their presence in Asia and Africa and their "natural" sense of
58 Mott T. Greene, Natural Knowledge in Pre-Classical Antiquity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1992), pp. 66-67, and Bernard McGrane, Beyond Anthropology: Society and the Other (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1989), p. 56.
59 Charles Boissevain, Tropisch Nederland (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1909), as discussed by J. van Goor, 
"Indische reizen in de negentiende en twintigste eeuw. Van verkenning tot joumalistiek toerisme," 
Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis 105,3 (1992): 458.
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superiority towards indigenous peoples through a historically specific language of 
politics and culture. Hackneyed emblems of male occidental strength and female 
oriental vulnerability frequently informed these narratives. Gender-based figures of 
speech concealed, while also revealing, unequal social positions that were unrelated to 
female versus male identity per se. Instead, such analogies constituted widely 
recognizable symbols, giving concrete expressions to perceived differences in 
hierarchy and power, intellectual ability, or moral refinement.60
The Dutch-Indonesian Conflict in Freud's Shadow
A second inspiration that shaped General Spoor's female and male imagery, 
although a more rarefied one, derived from the psychoanalytical language of Sigmund 
Freud. It could be that he was also aware of Carl Gustav Jung's reflections on the fluid 
coexistence of feminine and masculine qualities in the psyche of each human being, 
regardless of gender. His characterization of Indonesian or Nazi soldiers as either 
hysterical women or dreamy-eyed "Gretchen[s]-in-uniform" hinted at a familiarity 
with Jungian ideas. Spoor's story alluded to an array of psychoanalytic notions about 
the mechanism of hate transfer, the fracturing of the super ego, and father complexes 
or, in this case, an obsession with a "great-uncle." In the post-World War II era, both 
the memory and the lingering realities of colonial relationships were burdened with a 
Freudian resonance, as if individual neuroses also shed light on the use and abuse of 
power employed by European masters over their subjects, regardless of either the 
quiescence or defiance of the latter.
It was true that even before Freud's discursive cloud hovered over the lives of 
women and men in the Netherlands Indies, a Dutch psychiatrist around the turn of the 
century, Dr. Swart Abrahamsz, attributed the widespread sexual liaisons between 
Dutch men and Indonesian women to the residual "sadism" of the former and the 
"perennial masochism" of the latter.61 About two decades later, another Dutch 
psychiatrist, Dr. Travaglino, had diagnosed the Javanese psyche as being dominated 
by pre-pubescent, "primary instincts, a yearning for pleasure, and the excessive 
influence of sexuality."62 Travaglino's analysis echoed an intellectual curiosity about 
the homology between "primitivism and infantility" that had begun to fascinate a few 
of the younger acolytes orbiting around Sigmund Freud in Vienna. They had started to 
speculate about the parallels between the underdeveloped psyches of adult native 
people and Europeans' repressed memories of sexuality in early childhood, because 
examining these linkages might shed light on the formation of "normal" personality 
structures in the Western world.63
60 For an elaboration of these themes, see the "Introduction" to Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda, 
eds., Domesticating the Empire: Gender, Race, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism (Charlottesville, 
W : University of Virginia Press, in press; forthcoming in 1998).
61 Dr. Swart Abrahamsz in De Javabode, 1898, quoted by J. H. F. Kohlbrugge, Blikken in het zielenleven van 
den Javaan en zijne overheerschers (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1907), pp. 19-20.
62 P. H. M. Travaglino, "Het Karakter van den inlander," Tijdschrift van de Politieke-Economische Bond 
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Slowly but surely Freud's language seeped into the psychological understanding of 
a wide range of human behaviors at an individual as well as a collective level. 
Although ill-digested, in the post-war era these Freudian conjectures added spice to 
the imagination of a host of middle-class people in the West. One telling example of 
this generic familiarity with Freudian ideas is a colloquial expression that has entered 
the Dutch language, ik ken mijn pappenheimers (I know my pappenheimers), which means 
"I know with whom I am dealing." Pappenheimer is a reference to a young woman 
named Bertha Pappenheim, who had surmounted the debilitating symptoms of 
hysteria through a "chimney-sweeping, talking cure" with the physiologist Josef 
Breuer in 1880-1881. Under the pseudonym Anna O., her treatment became one of the 
central case studies analyzed by Freud and Breuer in their co-authored Studies on 
Hysteria (1895).64
During the first half of the twentieth century, psychoanalytic concepts such as 
megalomania, masochism, or revulsion emerged as compelling descriptions of the 
colonial system.65 The Indonesian nationalist Sutan Sjahrir, for example, wrote in the 
late 1930s with a Freudian echo that colonial mastery had always fostered 
"psychopathic" personalities, giving free reign to the "sadism and megalomania" 
among Dutch rulers and causing Indonesians' gentle souls to be "contorted by 
inferiority complexes."66 But in due course Freud's influence moved beyond an 
explanation of either individual neuroses or the manifest power of Europeans over 
native subjects in Asia or Africa, by claiming to cast a stream of enlightenment on the 
time-honored belligerence of human communities in general.
In trying to cast his shadow more widely, Freud claimed in 1935 that 
psychoanalysis, while yielding an understanding of "the mental life of the human 
individual," could also divulge explanations that might "solve many a riddle in the life 
of the masses of mankind"—or at least, bring humanity's enigmas out of obscurity and 
into "their true light."67 Memories of infantile sexuality and individual wish-
Mankind," in Jonathan Miller, ed., Freud (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicholson, 1972), pp. 86-95. For a 
discussion in the context of evolutionary theory, see Frances Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas Colonial 
Practice in the Netherlands Indies, 1900-1942 (Amsterdam/Ann Arbor, MI: Amsterdam University Press/ 
University of Michigan Press, 1995), pp. 124-125.
64 For a detailed discussion of the significance of the Anna O. case in the development of Freud's 
psychoanalytic theory, see Peter Gay, Freud: A Life for Our Time (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), 
pp. 63-69.
65 Megalomania constitutes a mental disorder characterized by extreme overestimation of one's abilities 
and importance or an obsession with grandiose action. Masochism entails a sexual perversion in which the 
"victim" derives pleasure from emotional or physical pain, registering a pathological desire for self- 
destruction. Revulsion is a psychic mixture of a "fear of losing one's identity and a fascination with this 
loss." This ambiguous reaction is said to originate in early childhood, when the child detaches itself from 
the mother, a moment that establishes either individual or sexual difference and imposes on a child its 
first traumatic loss. For a lucid discussion of revulsion—and indirectly, megalomania—in the context of 
the Dutch East Indies, see Pamela Pattynama, "Secrets and Danger: Interracial Sexuality in Louis 
Couperus, The Hidden Force (1900) and Dutch Colonial Culture," in Clancy-Smith and Gouda,
Domesticating the Empire, Chapter 4, (in press); for psychoanalytical insights, see Julia Kristeva, Powers of 
Horror An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
66 Soetan Sjahrir, Indonesische overpeinzingen (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1945; reprinted 1987), p. 165.
67 Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, trans. Joan Riviere (New York: Liveright, 
1935), p. 150.
Languages of Gender and Neurosis 63
fulfillment could row "upstream," so to speak, to release insights into the flow of 
desires, appetites, and deep-seated aggressions of all human societies that were forced 
to coexist.68
In the immediate post-war period, psychoanalytic terminology also inflected 
discourses at a collective level, enabling a State Department official to turn the tables 
on the Dutch and define their treatment of Indonesians as a display of "neurotic 
symptoms of frustration, inferiority, and over-compensation."69 With such crude 
Freudian insinuations in mind, the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, as General Spoor 
implied, resembled a bitter dispute between two partners who once upon a time had 
been tied together in a symbiotic relationship, albeit grounded in power and weakness. 
When Freud's silhouette began to lurk in the background, however, this collusive 
liaison acquired an aura of sexual perversion, which often seemed to entail male 
mastery and female subservience. As a result, colonialism's pattern of European 
domination and native bondage was rebaptized, on occasion, as a sado-masochistic 
fixation.70 But after August 1945, the passive accomplice was no longer willing to play 
the role of victim and had resolutely severed the sordid colonial ties by establishing 
autonomy. The Republic's abrupt escape into a realm out of reach and beyond control 
in Yogyakarta, in turn, produced an irrational fury in the formerly dominant partner 
from the Netherlands: this sudden distance prompted the latter to strike out in an 
undisguised attempt to destroy the errant Republic.71
During Indonesia's war of independence, yet another Dutch psychiatrist, Prof. Dr. 
Van Wulftten Palthe, used some of these Freudian ideas to psychoanalyze the 
Indonesian side of the equation. He noted that in the patrimonial colonial culture of 
the Dutch East Indies, Indonesian people had viewed the average Dutchman as a 
"father-imago," which implied the polar emotions of love and hate. But in 1942, the 
"militaristic typhoon of a small yellow race" descended from the north and swiftly 
toppled the Dutch East Indies government. The easy defeat of the Netherlands Indies 
military forces in 1942, though, made the colonial rulers seem like kernels of "sand 
blown from the rocks" by a gentle breeze rather than a mighty storm, the independent 
Indonesian nationalist and communist, Tan Malaka, commented in his diary.72 Japan's 
effortless victory prompted Van Wulfften Palthe to argue that it destabilized 
Indonesians' "child-father sentiments," which they quickly transferred from their 
Dutch fathers to the new Asian rulers from Japan.73
During the Japanese occupation, however, Van Wulfften Palthe noted that 
Indonesians eventually transferred their feelings of rancor, too, perhaps because the
68 Claude Levi-Strauss, The Jealous Potter, trans. Benedicte Chorier (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1988), pp. 196-97.
69 Policy Planning Staff/National Security Council, No. 51, "US Policy towards Southeast Asia,"
July 1,1949, RG 263, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Policy Papers, Box No 7, AN II.
70 Emily Apter calls it "the gendering of perversion," in Feminizing the Fetish: Psychoanalysis and Narrative 
Obsession in Turn-of-the-Century France (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. ix.
71 For an insightful discussion of the allure of femininity in the distance, see Danilyn Fox Rutherford, 
"Trekking to New Guinea: Colonial Fantasies of a Virgin Land, 1900-1942," Chapter 12, in Clancy-Smith 
and Gouda, Domesticating the Empire (in press).
72 Helen Jarvis, ed.,- Tan Malaka, From Jail to Jail, vol. 3 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1991), p. 72.
73 Van Wulfften Palthe, Psychological Aspects, pp. 9-13.
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Japanese were more hardhearted as "fathers" than the Dutch had been. The Japanese 
had not only inherited but also improved upon the "instruments of oppression" left 
behind by the Dutch, Tan Malaka recorded in his journal, which induced fear and 
loathing.74 Although it may be an apocryphal story, a Dutch report in 1944 claimed 
that the inhabitants of Java paid obeisance to Japanese military officers during the 
morning hours by transforming the formal Japanese greeting Ohayo gozaimas(u) into 
Hajo gasak mas, meaning "come on, let's kick him."75
In the wake of the Western allies' defeat of imperial Japan in August, 1945, Van 
Wulfften Palthe argued that the Indonesian population could no longer attach their 
"polar sentiments" to a particular object. All father figures had disappeared and 
Indonesian women and men's emotional polarities suddenly existed in a vacuum, 
"deranging the structure of their super ego" by emphasizing the negative, spiteful 
extremes of their emotional bi-polarity.76 Initially, catch phrases such as merdeka 
(freedom, independence) with its accompanying "pseudo-Nazi salute," as the Dutch 
psychiatrist called it, or red-and-white flags, functioned as fetishistic alternatives to the 
positive self-image Indonesians had previously derived from the paternal approval of 
either Dutch or Japanese officials.77 Indonesians' revolutionary slogans such as rakyat 
(the people) or manusia (humanity), perjuangan (struggle), kedaulatan (sovereignty), 
semangat (dynamic spirit), and of course merdeka and revolusi, began to function as 
magical credos, which expressed a newly forged intra-ethnic solidarity and produced 
an "ideological intoxication."78
Such "mantras" or "mystical chants" also bolstered the united purpose of 
Indonesians, even across the great social divide that existed between exalted priyayi 
(upper class) and simple peasants in the countryside.79 But given Van Wulfften 
Palthe's views concerning the inherent emotionality of the Indonesian people and 
assuming that hatred tends to function as an obstinate element in the human heart, he 
theorized that in the psychology of Indonesians, "a gradual fallback set in towards a
74 Tan Malaka, From Jail to Jail, Vol. 3, p. 72.
75 Charles Olke van der Plas, "Situation in the Netherlands Indies," report forwarded to the US Secretary 
of State by Walter A. Foote from Canberra, Australia on February 26,1944, Dispatch No. 58, in RG 165,
War Department, General and Special Staffs, Military Intelligence Division, Regional File Netherlands East 
Indies, Box 2631, NAII. Foote added a flourish to his translation of Hajo gasak mas: "come on, let's cut off 
his neck."
76 Van Wulfften Palthe, Psychological Aspects, p. 42. For the psychoanalytic background of Van Wulfften 
Palthe's analysis, see Sigmund Freud, "Splitting of the Ego in the Defensive Process," in Philip Rieff, ed., 
Sexuality and the Psychology of Love (New York: Shocken Books, 1963), pp. 209-213. Freud had written in 
1925 that in women such a derangement of the superego had different implications, because a woman's 
"superego never becomes so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its emotional origins" as a 
man's, quoted by Gay, Freud, p. 516.
77 Takao Fusayama, a Japanese officer in Medan in October, 1945, also observed that a nationalist leader, 
while addressing an audience, held "his right hand high like Adolf Hitler, the German dictator." From A 
Japanese Memoir of Sumatra 1945-1946: Love and Hatred in the Liberation War (Ithaca: Cornell Modem 
Indonesia Project, Monograph Series, No. 71,1993), p. 18.
78 Benedict R. O'G Anderson, "The Language of Indonesian Politics," in Language and Power: Exploring 
Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 123,139-140.
79 James Siegel uses the words "mantra" and "mystical chants" in Fetish, Recognition, Revolution (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 212.
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primitive stage of development."80 Or, in the language of a Dutch pulp novelist in 
1947: merdeka began to operate as "an incomprehensible, magical word without 
content," a term that disclosed all "the primitive bloodthirsty instincts of hatred."81
The Dutch psychiatrist asserted that these unique forms of regression, even among 
western-educated Indonesians who had achieved mental adulthood, produced 
"infantile reactions" in the affective sphere. This make-belief world of children gave 
"free play" to the most elementary impulses of aggression and cruelty, while in the in­
tellectual sphere, "archaistic-intuitive reasoning" began to prevail and wish fulfillment 
superseded logic and rationality. In a comparable fashion, Schermerhorn noted in his 
diary that many Indonesians suddenly seemed to live in "an eternal dream world, in 
which no one dared to call a spade a spade."82
According to Van Wulfften Palthe, a patricidal urge came in its wake, and 
Indonesians' ambivalent emotions "fell apart into their polar factors." On the one 
hand, the positive desire to please the father figure was replaced with a mother 
fixation—a set of feelings Indonesians began to express in a tempestuous new love for 
Ibu pertixvi, "mother earth," symbolically embodied in the Republic.83 The Dutch psy­
chiatrist also alleged that many Indonesians found a new love object in their own per­
sonalities as a form of "secondary narcissism," while all destructive emotions of anger 
and hatred were now projected onto Western politicians, Dutch soldiers, and "NICA- 
bandits" bent on vanquishing the Republic.84
In 1997 many of us might respond to Prof. Dr. Van Wulfften Palthe's 
psychoanalytical diagnosis of Indonesians' atavistic behavior with uncomfortable 
laughter or a healthy dose of skepticism. But in 1948, when General Spoor summoned 
the metonymy of the Indonesian Republic as a woman with a shattered super ego, who 
was guided primarily by childish instincts and narcissistic impulses—which had 
driven her rational Dutch partner to unprecedented extremes of angst—the Freudian 
resonance may have been palpable to the people who read his narrative. The report's 
bi-polar cliches regarding femininity and masculinity presumably endowed his story 
with an aura of sophistication as well as humor, even though it may seem problematic 
to a reader today.
The Infant Indonesian Republic and The UN Family of Nations
The international discussions that began in 1940-1945—focusing on what kind of 
new, global order should arise as a phoenix from the ashes of World War II— 
constituted a third inspiration for Spoor's picturesque narrative about the Dutch-
80 Van Wulfften Palthe, Psychological Aspects, pp. 13,42.
81 Piet Korthuys, In de ban van de tropen (Wageningen: Zomer & Keuning, 1947), p. 204.
82 Van Wulfften Palthe, Psychological Aspects, p. 4; Het dagboek van Schermerhorn, vol. 2, p. 695. The Dutch 
saying is "to call a cat a cat."
83 Van Wulfften Palthe, Psychological Aspects, pp. 3,43-45; Sumathi Ramaswamy, "Virgin Mother, Beloved 
Other: The Erotics of Tamil Nationalism in Colonial and Post-Colonial India," in Thamyris: Mythmaking 
from Past to Present, 4, no. 1 (1997), elaborates on Ibu Pertiwi's counterparts in India, embodied in Bharata 
Mata (Mother India) and regional emblems of what she calls "language/nation/mother," such as 
Tamilttaay (Tamil Mother), pp. 9-39.
84 Van Wulfften Palthe, Psychological Aspects, pp. 3-4,9,11-13,42-43. NICA was the acronym for 
Netherlands Indies Civil Administration.
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Indonesian family romance gone awry. When he painted a picture of a neutral 
international agency, trying to arbitrate the tension between two antithetical 
aspirations that were embodied in male and female stereotypes, he invoked yet 
another post-World War II rhetoric. This discourse proposed that only an impartial 
council of elderly and experienced trustees could prevent armed aggression among the 
world's independent nations in the future. On October 8,1948, the day that Frederick 
Nolting in the State Department received Spoor's story about the Dutch-Indonesian 
confrontation as a misbegotten courtship, the gendered vocabulary of family relations 
had acquired both a scholarly and global twist. This modernized version was used by 
various statesmen and academics throughout the world once Nazi Germany had been 
defeated and the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 had 
sealed the fate of imperial Japan.
In the wake of the fratricidal carnage of World War II, a new structure of 
international relations was to be born. All independent countries across the globe 
would be incorporated into the family of nations by becoming active members of the 
United Nations. The UN Security Council, meanwhile, would monitor the world's 
harmonious co-existence and adjudicate family feuds in a paternalistic manner. The 
Security Council's permanent members, representing the most powerful elders of the 
world community of nations, would be joined by a constantly shifting array of elected 
members serving a two-year term.
The new global order would embrace every free and sovereign country, whether it 
was a long-established one or a brand new nation bom out of anti-colonial struggles— 
the many "infant states" which had begun "to kick and bawl lustily, claiming a 
spontaneous maturity."85 As President Franklin Roosevelt had predicted: in the post­
war era there would be "many minor children" among the nations of the world who 
might "need trustees."86 In the original creation of the United Nations and the 
definition of its duties, the United States played a role that was more significant than 
any other member state, both ideologically and financially.
As a result, the US was cast in the role of a venerable patriarch or a protective older 
brother, while the Soviet Union, as in General Spoor's allegory, was rendered as a 
sinister uncle who constantly tried to dislodge the American pater familias from his 
august position of power. He did so by seducing innocent daughters or swaying the 
loyalty of gullible sons in the family of nations. Family metaphors continued to infuse 
the dialogue about international relations and the Cold War, and southeast Asian 
nations—whether the newly independent Filipinos or their "martyred Indonesian 
brothers," who were still fighting for freedom—were caught in the same old semantic 
web.87 Thus, when the Netherlands finally relinquished its sovereignty over the 
archipelago in late December, 1949, President Harry Truman welcomed Indonesia into 
"the family of peace-loving, independent nations."88
85 Coast, Recruit to Revolution, p. 7.
86 Quoted by McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, p. 61.
87 "Filipino Indignation at Dutch Action in Indonesia," Dispatch No. 2 from Thomas H. Bockett in the US 
Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, January 3,1949, RG 59, Box No 6440,856D.00/1-349, NAII.
88 Quoted by Gardner, Shared Hopes, Separate Fears, p. 92.
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The history of the American relationship with the Philippines was an instructive 
example. During the Roosevelt administration in the 1930s, when concerns with social 
justice had become a more prominent feature in US domestic as well as foreign policy, 
the formal process of decolonization in the Philippines reached its logical conclusion. 
The McDuffie-Tydings Act, passed by the US Congress in 1934, mandated the 
unequivocal independence of the Philippines in ten years.89 Hence, in the immediate 
post-war period, the Philippines had emerged as a full-fledged member of the family 
of nations; technically it was allowed to squeal as "lustily" as any ancient European 
country. The emancipation of the Filipino nation was a source of self-righteous 
American pride. In 1944, for instance, Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, had 
reminded European colonial powers that "an excellent example of what can be 
achieved [in the colonial sphere] is afforded in the record of our relationship with the 
Philippines."90
But in the caustic opinion of the Indonesian Republic's representative to the UN 
Security Council in New York, Leonardus Nicodemus Palar—"Nico" or "Nick," as he 
preferred to be called—America "gloated" a little too much about the supposedly 
magnanimous way in which it had granted freedom to its "former wards."91 Even 
though the country was now an autonomous member of the United Nations, Palar 
noted in June 1946, that the Filipino nation was nonetheless tied with "much more than 
merely amicable relations" to its former colonial overlord 92 From such jaundiced 
perspectives—and Palar was not alone in articulating this opinion—the relationship 
between the US and the Philippines in 1946 portended the phenomenon of neo­
colonialism. As an editorial in St. Louis Globe Democrat noted in December 1948, the 
Filipino response to the "American course of indoctrination" often entailed a 
perception that it was nothing but "another means of permanent enslavement."93
Manuel Quezon, as he lay dying of tuberculosis in Manila towards the end of 
World War II, vented his anger at the American "neo-imperialists" and 
"condescending bastards" who hovered around him and his nationalist comrades. 
Americans, he wrote, would forever think that Filipinos were their "little brown 
brothers," an attitude confirmed by Senator Robert Taft when he pontificated in the 
Senate in April 1946, that the US "shall always be a big brother to the Philippines,"
89 Gerlof Homan, "The United States and the Netherlands East Indies: The Evolution of American Anti- 
Colonialism," Pacific Historical Review 53,4 (1984): 436. See also Frances Gouda, "Visions of Empire: 
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90 Cordell Hull made the statement on March 21,1944. Quoted in full by Charles Bidien, "The United 
Nations and the Colonies," in Indonesian Review 1 ,2  (September, 1945): 4.
91 "Wards" was Clare Boothe Luce's description of Filipinos in the US House of Representatives. In 
Congressional Record- Appendix (1945), December 6,1945. She also referred to the failure of the US to 
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whether or not it was an independent nation.94 However, America's position as a 
patronizing older brother among Filipinos would linger on, thanks to its extensive 
economic concessions and its foothold in an array of US military bases.
A similar attitude prevailed with regard to Indonesians while they battled for their 
right to be free. In April, 1949, for instance, an American businessman representing the 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company—which maintained substantial interests in 
rubber plantations on the east coast of Sumatra—used identical language when posing 
an anxious question to State Department officials: "What are we going to do with our 
little brown brothers in Indonesia?"95 Obviously, a large number of Dutch people and 
pundits in other Western nations dismissed the proposition that the meek inhabitants 
of the Indonesian archipelago were ready to defend themselves or maintain the 
nation's internal harmony. A host of observers in the West regarded Indonesian 
independence as an absurd idea, because they perceived Indonesians as unskilled and 
naive—as a people who should merely "occupy themselves with gamelan music and 
wayang dramas," while relying on the help of a father figure or an older brother from 
the West to guide them in the immediate future.96
The Death of Effeminacy: Indonesians Reborn as Srikandi the Warrior or Macho 
Cowboy
The Dutch as well as other Westerners "had much to learn" in the opinion of 
Charlton Ogburn, who reached this judgment through his experiences in Indonesia in 
1947-1948. If he had invoked the two female wayang characters who are among the 
most familiar to an average Javanese audience, he might have suggested that the 
Republic had ceased to be the lady-like Sumbadra. Instead, she had become the 
"masculine" and "strong-willed" Srikandi, whose defense of her "self-worth, even in 
the face of death," was paramount.97 For instance, when Ogburn visited the official 
Indonesian fighting forces under the command of Colonel Latief in east Java in early 
1948, he recalled he only saw exceptionally "tough and competent blokes": Indonesian 
soldiers who concentrated on winning their anti-colonial war with steely-eyed 
resolve.98 Among civilians, many young dare-devils had become "self-appointed
94 Quoted by Theodore Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy: Japan Against the West in Java and Luzon, 1942-1945 
(Princeton: Princeton Univesity Press, 1988), p. 285.
95 H. L. Riddle, Assistant Comptroller of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, in Memorandum of 
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96 "Charlton Ogburn recalls the early days of a new nation," Newsletter of the United States-Indonesia Society, 
Spring, 1996, pp. 7-9.
97 Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia 
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98 "Ogburn recalls the early days of a new nation," Nervsletter US-Indonesia Society, pp. 7-9.
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guerrilla leaders" who roamed the countryside and took the law into their own hands 
to further the cause of one-hundred percent merdeka."
In the imagination of a handful of Western eyewitnesses in Java, these powerful 
freedom fighters had liberated themselves from the stereotype of mild-mannered 
Javanese men. As a British military officer, stationed in post-World War II Jakarta, 
concluded early on: Indonesian nationalism was not a "shallow, effeminate, 
intellectual cult"; instead, it was an "urgent affair."9 100 Colonel William Meyer, the US 
military attache in Bandung, also warned the State Department that the Dutch 
woefully "underestimated the strength and virility" of the Republic.101 Hence, it was 
unlikely that many of these tough blokes had any inclination to marvel at the magic of 
wayang performances throughout a long and sultry night. It could be that some among 
them agreed with Tan Malaka, who scoffed at wayang stories because "none of their 
answers made sense" and they did not nurture "intelligent thinking."102
But most Republican soldiers probably did not watch the intricate plots derived 
from the Mahabharata and Ramayana or the Panji tales unfold between sunset and 
sunrise owing to a lack of time and leisure. If and when they thought about wayang 
stories at all, Indonesian freedom fighters may have harbored the fantasy that they 
could personally enact the wayang legends about heroic kesatria (noble) warriors; they 
might have imagined they would soon defeat the Dutch in Indonesia just as Hanuman 
and his army of monkeys had routed the evil Rahwana in the Ramayana epic.
At the same time, such lofty dreams were translated into down-to-earth military 
strategies and guerrilla tactics. The warriors operating in the Javanese or Sumatran 
landscape, Ogbum suggested, were tough as nails—or, in the words of an awed Dutch 
soldier who had seen the official TNI army as well as pemuda units perform in the field: 
"I raise my hat to them, because these soldiers are as hard as metal."103 As the 
Indonesian writer Subagio Sastrowardojo wrote in his short story Kedjantanan di 
Sumbing (Masculinity on Mount Sumbing), the battlefield of the Indonesian revolution
99 The term was used by Chinese Consul General Tsiang Chia-Tung in a letter to UNCI in Batavia, 
September 14,1949, complaining about the "many Chinese residents [who] have been forcibly removed 
from their places of abode . . .  under the pretext of affording protection to the Chinese population." In 
DAG13 /2.O.O. /#6, UN Archives, NYC.
100 Laurens van der Post's secret report to the Foreign Office in London, "The British Occupation of 
Indonesia, from September 19,1945 to November 30,1946," in The Admiral's Baby, p. 225.
101 Col. William Meyer to American Consulate General in Batavia, August 1,1948, "US Problems in 
Indonesia in Event of War," Enclosure to Despatch No. 300, August 5,1948, Charles A. Livengood to 
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soldier also wrote that "We reviled the Germans for their cruelty but a Netherlander is not a bit better in 
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was an arena in which "only masculinity was held in esteem."104 The staunch 
defenders of the Indonesian Republic had organized themselves into a disciplined 
army and an effective guerrilla force, with no other purpose but to resist the 
reimposition of Dutch colonial control. According to one account, these rugged 
soldiers instructed ordinary citizens living in Dutch-controlled territory "to remain 
faithful to our Republic of Indonesia . . . and murder people who help the Dutch" 
because they "are traitors."105
Such commands registered the determination of the Republic's guardians to battle 
their former colonial masters to the bitter end. When the anti-colonial struggle 
demanded subversive action, they violated the truce agreements with the same 
impunity as their European adversaries. Rather than conforming to Dutch stereotypes 
about the submissive and fey Javanese or the clever but reasonable Minangkabau, the 
defenders of the Indonesian Republic proved to be hardy fighters. Some among them 
also hoped to undermine the feudal hierarchy of traditional Javanese communities, in 
which patterns of command and subordination were grounded in the putative 
superiority of local priyayi and the diligence of peasants.
"Our troops," Mohammad Hatta wrote in July 1948, were able to continue "the 
guerrilla struggle in the mountains, ravines, forests, and other remote places, because 
they were loyal to the government and complied with its orders." Hatta patted himself 
on the back when he emphasized, for example, that "each of the 35,000 TNI soldiers, 
whose whereabouts [in Dutch controlled areas] were heretofore unknown, executed 
the command to move to Republican territory in a universally disciplined manner." 
This efficient response proved that the Republican government "controlled its military 
apparatus and was able to instill order among its troops."106 If the Dutch played 
hardball and tried to coerce the Indonesian Republic into making concessions, 
Republican politicians responded in kind, as if wanting to remind their Dutch 
antagonists of Winston Churchill's pithy comment: "if you want to play rough, we can 
play rough too."107
104 Subagio Sastrowardojo, "Kedjantanan di Sumbing," translated as "Mannelijkheid op de Sumbing," in 
Joop van den Berg, ed., Bersiap Nederlands-lndonesische verhalen (The Hague: BZZToH, 1993), p. 116. Both 
the Indonesian word jantan and the Dutch verb zich vermannen have the dual meaning of masculinity and 
mustering courage. According to Lucas and Cribb, "Women's Roles in the Indonesian Revolution," in 
Taufik Abdullah, ed., The Heartbeat of [the] Indonesian Revolution, p. 75, note 12, the term pemuda initially 
embraced both female and male nationalists. Eventually it became more exclusively associated with men, 
whereas a new word, pemudi, emerged as a female form. During the Revolution, the growing gender 
specificity of the word pemuda was also suggested by names such as Pemuda Putri Indonesia, Pemuda Putri 
Republik Indonesia, or Barisan Pemuda Putri; see Ima H. N. Hadi Soewito, ed., Seribu Wajah■ Wanita Pejuang 
Dalam Kancah Revolusi '45 (Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1995), pp. 367-371
105 "Extract from Instructions to a Kampong Head, 5th November, 1947, Brataadisasmita, A. W. R. I. in 
Boelakamba, to the Loerah of Doekoehlo, November 5,1947"; report translated and forwarded by the 
Dutch delegation to the GOC, In DAG13/2.0.0/#l, UN Archives, NYC.
106 "Ichtisar singkat tentang perundingan Renville," (signed M. Hatta in pencil), July 30,1948, Yogya 
Dokumen No. 5403, ANJ. Colonal C.S. Meyers, a UN Military Observer (MILOB), noted the "shock of our 
smug [Dutch] 'friends'" when they had to concede that 35,000 Indonesian guerrilla troops had operated in 
Netherlands controlled territory; quoted by MacMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, p. 211.
107 A good example of the Republic's cool political calculations is the anonymous report, "Tjatatan tentang 
keadaan perundingan," November 1,1948, Yogya Dokumen No. 5671, ANJ. See also Thijs W. Brocades
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On the left of the political spectrum, Tan Malaka, about six months before his death 
in February 1949, had extolled the guerrilla fighting force, which "will establish [our 
nation's] one-hundred percent freedom with bamboo spears, hand grenades, hand 
guns, submachine guns, mortars, and torches, however long it will take, whether with 
or without the United Nations." In celebration of May Day in 1949, a magazine of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), Bintang Merah (Red Star), applauded "our 
guerrilla fighters who have forged a powerful unity and have risked their bodies and 
souls for the freedom of our country."108
In a similar vein, the American cultural attache remarked in September 1949, that 
thousands of Republican foot soldiers had willingly left their families in order to 
embrace a rugged "semi-nomadic" existence, "with the government providing many 
of their needs," even when villagers in the countryside had occasionally given them 
"food and shelter." These young men had proven their masculine, self-sacrificing 
valor. They had braved "the adventures of guerrilla life" while enduring many 
"deprivations," but both the "student army" and TNI troops had also exhibited self- 
discipline and a cooperative spirit.109
On both sides of the battlefield, observers made an analogy between Republican 
freedom fighters and macho cowboys in the American Wild West. The references to 
cowboys probably drew upon the rich heritage of Javanese or Malay epics about 
brigands, social bandits, or spiritual wanderers in search of enlightenment. Such 
traditional chronicles recounted the exploits of seemingly invulnerable jago  
(champions). These "magico-religious bandits," filled with mystical knowledge, had 
deserted their fixed places "in the cosmologically sanctioned social order" and thrown 
themselves into a tramping life of adventure, robbery, and fighting. A well-known 
character in Malay folklore was Si Pitung. Si Ronda, Si Jampang, or Si Tjonat were 
other champions who had entered the popular imagination.110
In addition, inexpensive Dutch translations in the 1930s of Karl May's stories—a 
German equivalent, to some extent, of James Fenimore Cooper's tales—about 
American Indians who bravely resisted the onslaughts of European settlers, cowboys, 
and soldiers on the western frontier, may have functioned as a source of inspiration,
Zaalberg, "Paving the Way to Independence: Nationalism, Communism, and the Changing American Role 
in the Indonesian Struggle for Independence," MA Thesis, History, University of Groningen, 1997, p. 106.
108 Tan Malaka, Sang gerilja dan gerpolek (stencil, Pustaka Murba, May 17,1948, written while he was in 
prison in Madiun), pp. 77-78; in Yogya Dokumen, No. 5278, ANJ; Bintang Merah, Bulletin No 8, labeled 
"Agit-Prop, C.C. Darurat PKI," May 1,1949, in Yogya Dokumen No. 5716; stenciled pamphlet Rakyat 
Indonesia, December 20,1948, in Yogya Dokumen No. 5433, ANJ. It should be noted that Indonesians 
affiliated with the PKI—or followers of Tan Malaka's independent ideological legacy—tended to 
denounce the Republic's democratic leadership of "Hatta, Sukiman, c.s." as "traitors" to the Indonesian 
struggle for independence.
109 Wiiiarci a . Hanna to Glenn A. Abbey, "Observations Made on My Visit to Jogjakarta (Sept. 8 -13) 
Regarding Political Situation in The Republic," Forwarded to the Secretary of State by Glenn A. Abbey,
No. 329, September 19,1949, RG 59, Box 6442,856D.00/9-1949, NAII.
110 See especially Chapter 1 on "Youth and Crisis" in Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, pp. 1-15; 
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too.111 Moreover, a record of the superhuman escapades of another hero from the 
United States, Flash Gordon, appeared in serialized form in the weekly newspaper De 
Orient in Batavia in the late 1930s. And before the outbreak of the Revolution in 1945, a 
few movie theaters in the bigger cities on Java and Sumatra had featured American 
Westerns, familiarizing a part of the Indonesian public with notorious outlaws and 
righteous sheriffs in the Wild West.112 Even in the small town of Sibolongat in north 
Sumatra, Karo Batak boys had formed an organization in 1938 that sponsored monthly 
film showings in the local marketplace, and it is not unlikely that cowboy movies 
appeared in the regular repertoire.113
During the Indonesian Revolution, the customary references to flamboyant jago, 
who had stepped outside the ordained hierarchies of daily life in order to pursue the 
goal of Indonesia's merdeka, were modernized, so to speak, and translated into a more 
contemporary imagery. The writer Idrus, in his classic short story Surabaja described 
the pemuda, who fought the British Gurkha troops in Surabaya in November 1945 tooth 
and nail, as "cowboys" confronting "bandits" with faces as "black as locomotives." 
When the bandits, with bayonets pointed at their rivals' hearts, shouted "Your gun or 
your life!" the cowboys refused to put up their hands or to surrender their weapons. 
Instead, they yelled back: "'Take our lives,' and as they shouted these words, they 
began to fire. The bandits too opened fire and a fierce fight ensued."114
A month later, when troops under the British South East Asia Command (SEAC) 
cleared the city of Batavia and routed many fiery nationalists in "Operation Pounce," 
one of the more colorful revolutionary champions, Imam Syafe'i, left town mounted on 
a white horse with followers in his wake.115 In the imagination of those who watched 
his theatrical exit, it is possible that this spectacle conjured up characters in cowboy 
movies such as Jesse James or Billy the Kid, riding across the prairie with an angry 
sheriff in hot pursuit. Some Indonesian revolutionaries replicated American cowboys' 
romantic attachment to their horses, highlighted in many Hollywood westerns, 
because they were similarly fascinated with horses as "symbols of power, freedom,
111J. D. Legge, Intellectuals and Nationalism in Indonesia: A Study of the Following Recruited by Sutan Sjahrir in 
Occupation Jakarta (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, Monograph Series, No. 68,1988), p. 76.
112 Batavia's former and future US Consul-General wrote to General Douglas MacArthur in 1944 that "the 
natives of the East Indies" were especially fond of American "Westerns," quoted by Gardner, Shared Hopes 
- Separate Fears, p. 8. On November 1,1944, the well-known Dutch movie director, Joris Ivens, was 
appointed as Netherlands East Indies Film Commissioner. Ivens had many contacts in the US film 
industry. During the war, he directed a "Lester Cowan United Artists Production" in Hollywood called 
"Woman of the Sea"; it is not unlikely that he arranged for American Westerns to be shown in the Indies. 
See "Biographical Notes on Prominent Individuals in Government Service and in Business," OSS, R & A 
No. 2647, March 15,1945, RG 165, War Department, General and Special Staffs, Military Intelligence 
Division, Regional File Netherlands East Indies, Box 2631.
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press).
114 Idrus, "Surabaja," Orientatie 5 ,44  (1952); an English translation of this passage can be found in 
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and defiance."116 Imam Syafe'i's retreat on horseback may also have summoned 
memories of Karl May's stories about Old Shatterhand and Winnetou, when forced to 
regroup after Yankee soldiers or rowdy cowboys had invaded their ancestral hunting 
grounds.
Some Indonesian commentators lamented the phenomenon of cowboyism among 
TNI soldiers or the Wild West behavior of the more unruly pemuda squads in such 
areas as the countryside near Cirebon. "Since the beginning of our Revolutionary era 
we have noticed the emergence of 'cowboy-isme' symptoms," an article in Kutipan 
Patriot (Patriotic Quotations) stated on October 14, 1947; "Our nation's sons have 
become brash people who behave like highway robbers or think they resemble the 
pistol-waving heroes they have seen in motion pictures with Humphrey Bogart or the 
Dead End Kids." There were too many "fake guerrilla fighters who behave like 
cowboys," another central Javanese eyewitness wrote, such as the "bogus para-military 
units led by Hindartono, the adjutant of Tan Malaka, who actually employ Gestapo 
tactics."117 About six months later, a Dutch amateur photographer took pictures of TNI 
soldiers strolling through the streets of Yogyakarta, dressed up, he remarked, as 
"veritable Wild West characters." Some Dutch soldiers in the field, meanwhile, were 
not immune to the Wild West style or cowboy fashion: they had special leather cowboy 
holsters made for them.118
In addition, in the coastal town of Tuban to the northwest of Surabaya, a rogue 
lieutenant-colonel named Zakaria, who had been dismissed from the Indonesian Navy 
(ALRI unit XIII), had formed a mobile brigade that engaged in shameful conduct, 
prompting the population to hate the renegades. It was reported that the brigade's 
members in Tuban resembled "pirates," functioning as an "armed gang of robbers who 
steal from the inhabitants: they confiscate possessions and sabotage government 
services."119 It could be that in this context, yet another American movie idol—Errol 
Flynn, playing a swashbuckling buccaneer in a series of Hollywood motion pictures— 
came to mind. And in the central Javanese city of Solo in mid-September, 1948, the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had supposedly tried to create a "Wild West area 
of agitation and general lawlessness" to deflect attention from the build-up of PKI 
power in the town of Madiun in central Java.120 A few months later, the Solo "kraton
116 William H. Frederick, "The Appearance of Revolution: Cloth, Uniforms, and the ‘Pemuda Style' in East 
Java, 1945-1949," in Henk Schulte Nordholt, ed., Outward Appearances: Dressing the State and Society 
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117 Rosihan Anwar, interview with Paul F. Gardner, September 10,1994, reported in Shared Hopes, Separate 
Fears, p. 67; "Cowboy-isme," Kutipan Patriot 61 (October 14,1947); Toeroenan, "Gadoengan laskar a la cow 
boy," undated, addressed to Dj. M. Santoso and Adj. Insp. Moch. Djen of the Republican Police, in Arsip 
Kepolisian Negara RI, 1947-49, No. 47, ANJ.
118 In a lecture in the Savoy Homan Hotel to a group of European residents in Bandung on June 30,1948. 
The amateur photographer was Lieutenant Drielsma, whose presentation was reported and reviewed in 
De Preangerbode, July 1,1948. In Yogya Dokumen, No. 5284, ANJ; Willem Moraal, Mariniers in actie op oost- 
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119 R. Mujomiseno, in Economics Section of Ministry of Defense in Yogyakarta, to Chief of the Secretariat 
of the Ministry of Defense regarding "the Abuses in Tuban," January 22,1948, Yogya Dokumen, No. 5729, 
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120 George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 
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family and bangsawan” (i.e. Sultan Pakubuwono XII on behalf of his entourage and 
noble relatives) addressed a pathetic appeal to President Sukarno: "the so-called 
popular movement in Solo has generated excesses and provoked anxiety among the 
city's population, which seems in doubt as to whom it should obey and whom it can 
trust." The kraton spokesman complained that the uncouth members (kasar) of the 
neighborhood committees in Solo terrorized the city's inhabitants through kidnapping 
and random violence.121
Conclusion
By employing what Frank Costigliola has called "tropes of gender and pathology," 
Spoor appropriated masculinity and rational thinking as core values of the Dutch 
nation, while he demonized the Indonesian Republic as a hysterical woman. His 
representation of the Republic's custodians as an out-of-control female registered his 
scorn for his adversaries; he continued to view them as colonial subjects, presumably 
because they lacked virile strength and manly self-discipline.122 The commander-in- 
chief seemed incapable of acknowledging the effectiveness of hard-as-metal 
Indonesian soldiers. He also failed to concede the sophistication of Republican 
politicians, whose wish to throw off the yoke of Dutch colonialism merged with an 
attempt to loosen the shackles of feudal Javanese values—at least, on the part of the 
social democrats among the founding fathers of the Republic.
In this combined effort, grace and humility were useless attributes during a 
lightning guerrilla strike. Displaying refinement was an equally futile exercise during a 
formal TNI engagement with Dutch military forces. Neither ceremony nor intricate 
forms of courtesy helped Republican political leaders when they were forced to play 
rough with their equally rough Dutch counterparts. As the Deputy Commander of 
Central Java, Colonel Suharto, reputedly told his TNI troops in the wake of the 
colonizers' second "treacherous" military attack within three years: "the fighting spirit 
of the people" has triumphed. Our Dutch enemies have misinterpreted "Indonesians' 
goodwill and peace-loving attitude . . .  as a sign of weakness. [We] have now taken up 
arms and do not intend to lay them down" until the Dutch comply with our "just 
demands."123
Within the newly configured cultural landscape of the Yogyakarta Republic, iron- 
willed determination conferred greater personal status and yielded better political and 
military results than a soft-spoken expression of delicate Javanese breeding. As an 
Indonesian freedom fighter would remember thirty years later: when the struggle for 
independence grew fierce and dangerous, most revolutionaries "became braver and
Indonesia Project, Monograph Series, No. 69,1989), for a discussion about the authenticity of the 
documents on which this quotation is based, p. 89.
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123 "Message from Col. Suharto, Deputy Commander of Central Java," Merdeka (Ceylon), II, 3 (February 
20,1949): ii.
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more determined (nekad), even to the point of being increasingly mad (gila)."124 While 
ousting the Dutch colonial overlords was their principal objective, some defenders of 
the Republic may also have cultivated their toughness in an effort to undermine the 
age-old patterns of Javanese lordship and bondage.
Master and servant relationships had established co-dependence in Indonesian 
society under Dutch colonial rule before the Japanese occupation; such entrenched 
social habits had endowed the status quo ante with a gloss of coherence. In 1942, 
though, the future president of the Indonesian Republic had pleaded with all 
Indonesians to throw off the jiwa budak (servant spirit) in their souls. Occasionally, 
Sukarno marked the Javanese willingness to oblige and follow commands as a 
feminine trait. He had worn European trousers for most of his adult life; it has been 
reported that he mocked deferential priyayi, who still dressed in a traditional batik 
sarung, for "looking like a woman."125 True independence, Sukarno implored, could 
only take shape if Indonesians learned to exult in their jiwa ksatriya (noble spirit), 
which may have been a reference to the unambiguous masculinity of a wayang 
personality such as Bima.126
During the Revolution, the leaders who struggled to create an independent 
Indonesian nation seemed to heed Sukarno's admonition. The Republic's rank-and-file 
embraced a "romantic brotherhood" and tried, in some places, to reach across social 
and ethnic divisions.127 Republican politicians, meanwhile, displayed a boldness and 
cunning that could be designated masculine in character. Collectively, Indonesians' 
behavior provided a stark contrast with Spoor's archaic description of the Republic as 
a mercurial female. In 1983, the Indian psychiatrist Ashis Nandy classified this new 
determination and vigor, whether in India or in other societies warped by European 
imperialism such as Indonesia, as the "hypermasculinity" of nationalist movements, 
which was a necessary step in the "discovery of self" on the part of colonized men, 
who had been emasculated by colonial rulers for hundreds of years.128 Of course a 
range of so-called Dutch experts observed the new intractability of their former 
colonial subjects with astonishment and disbelief. They labeled Indonesians' rock-solid 
stance as infantile obstinacy, retrogressive behavior, or a gratification of "secondary 
narcissism." Other Dutchmen, in turn, produced a diagnosis of insanity or mass 
hysteria.
But Spoor's narrative went beyond the tendency to represent male colonial subjects 
as antipodes. Instead of characterizing Indonesian Republicans as merely languid and 
unmanly, he dressed them in full-fledged female guise. He conjured up a picture of the
124 Siegel, Fetish, Recognition, Revolution, p. 220.
125 Richard Cribb's Interview with Wim Hendrix, November 19,1981, p. 3. Algemeen Rijksarchief, 2nd 
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Republic as a feisty, modern woman whose "facelift," to borrow the language from 
Y. B. Mangunwijaya's novel Durga Umayi, had given birth to an unprecedented self- 
confidence.129 Since the proclamation of independence on August 17, 1945, she knew 
exactly what she wanted and her primary goal was to terminate for once and for all the 
family romance with a Dutchman she loathed. She was just as "disputatious" as the 
wayang character Srikandi.130 She was also capable of strategic political thinking and 
aggressive behavior, if necessary, to achieve her objectives. In Spoor's rendering, the 
Indonesian Republic, from the day of its inception, had spumed the Javanese mandates 
of being mild-mannered and refined (halus).
Besides, it is possible that Spoor's analysis of the Yogyakarta Republic as a female 
neurotic, who suffered from mental illness and required psychiatric help, might have 
served as an avoidance mechanism that prompted him to project his subliminal 
emotional anguish onto his enemy. The outside world's response to the Republic's 
unbending strength and intelligent manipulation of international public opinion 
perhaps contributed to the psychological unraveling of General Spoor, too. Indonesian 
politicians had been reincarnated from gentle "lambs" into "wolves," former Minister 
of Overseas Territories in the Netherlands, Charles O. Welter, stated ruefully in May 
1949; he noted that the predatory instincts of these "wolves" were reportedly boosted 
by "American capitalism," enabling them to destroy the "lifelines of the Dutch 
nation."131 By transforming themselves into uncompromising soldiers as well as hard- 
nosed politicians in the course of their anti-colonial struggle, the architects of the 
Indonesian Republic ceased being docile little "lambs" and managed to throw off the 
emblem of effeminacy altogether.
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